Abstract. I study repeated competition among oligopolists. The only novelty is that firms may go bankrupt and permanently exit: the probability that a firm survives a price war depends on its financial strength, which varies stochastically over time. Under some conditions including no entry, an anti-folk theorem holds: when firms are patient, so that strength levels change relatively fast, every Nash equilibrium involves an immediate price war that lasts until at most one firm remains.
Introduction
In this paper, I study dynamic competition among multiple firms. The model differs from the usual repeated game setting only in that firms may go bankrupt and irrevocably exit the market. In each period, each active firm has a state variable corresponding to its financial strength. That state, which is publicly observed, moves stochastically over time, with Markov transitions that depend on per-period profits.
A firm goes bankrupt with positive probability after a string of low profits. Thus, any active firm can start a price war that ends only when it or all its rivals are driven into bankruptcy. A firm in a strong financial position is more likely to survive a price war, all else equal, than a weak firm. The main result (Theorem 1) establishes a condition under which when firms are patient, then in any Nash equilibrium a price war begins very quickly (before much discounted time has passed) and lasts until a single active firm is left as a monopolist. That is, collusion is impossible for patient firms.
To fix ideas, consider a market with symmetric Bertrand competition between two firms. An active firm always has the option of starting a price war by setting a price of zero until either it or its rival goes bankrupt. The firm can thus guarantee itself an expected long-run payoff close to the monopoly payoff times the firm's probability of winning a price war. If a firm is stronger financially than its rival, then it has a better than even chance of winning a price war. When the firms are very patient, then, in equilibrium the stronger firm must get over half of the available profits. A firm with an initial advantage, therefore, must immediately start a price war. Otherwise, the stochastic movement of financial strength levels means that its rival will quickly gain the advantage. At that point, the rival can ensure itself over half of the profit, and the long-run share remaining for the first firm is less than its expected payoff would have been from an immediate price war. The no-collusion result (Theorem 1) follows.
More generally, suppose that there are N firms competing, whether in Bertrand fashion or otherwise. As patience increases, in equilibrium each firm gets an expected payoff no less than the expected long-run payoff from starting a price war, equal to the monopoly payoff π M times the firm's probability of winning the price war. If firms collude and no bankruptcies occur in equilibrium, then a firm can wait until it is in a strong financial position relative to its rivals, start a price war when its winning probability is high, and thereby get an expected payoff equal to that high probability multiplied by π M . But if that expected payoff exceeds a 1/N share of collusive profits (Condition NC in Section 3), then for each firm to get such an expected payoff is infeasible, since the sum of payoffs would exceed the total collusive profits available.
Thus, bankruptcies must occur quickly, before the random process driving financial state transitions gives every firm a turn being stronger than its rivals.
Intuitively, a firm initially in a strong position prefers starting a price war right away to risking a deterioration in its position. To avert a price war, firms that are initially weak would be willing to promise a strong rival a large share of future profits.
However, when those weak firms eventually become strong they are no longer willing to make the promised transfers; they prefer to take their chances with a price war.
Since the strong firm can foresee that outcome, an initial price war cannot be averted.
The prediction of fighting till bankruptcy is consistent with historical examples, as detailed below. For fixed levels of patience, the model can also be used to explain patterns of collusion in markets. Dividing market demand asymmetrically may make collusion easier. The effect of cartel size on the ability to collude is nonmonotonic:
collusion between n firms may be sustainable when collusion between n − 1 or n + 1 firms is not. Similarly, more patient firms may be more or less able to collude than less patient firms -increasing patience has the usual repeated-game effect of making a one-time gain less attractive, but it also reduces the weight placed on the temporary losses during a price war relative to the potential long-run stream of monopoly profits for the winner. Subgame perfect equilibria (SPEs) exist where firms collude when they have equal financial strengths and fight only when one is stronger. A final, counterintuitive result is that the possibility of entry (at a cost) facilitates collusion:
a potential entrant might risk a price war against a single firm, but the chances of winning a price war against multiple firms are low enough to discourage entry.
The assumption that firms may be forced to exit after strings of low profits is based on models of capital market imperfections driven by moral hazard, such as
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Tirole's (2006) Chapter 3 summarizes those models
and their predictions that firms with low net worth may face credit rationing. His
Chapter 2 describes some stylized facts about corporate finance, in particular the finding that "firms with more cash on hand and less debt invest more, controlling for investment opportunities." Many papers in the literature on the "deep pockets" or "long purse" model of predatory pricing make similar assumptions about financially weak firms facing exit as a result of borrowing constraints. See, for example, Benoit (1984), Tirole (1985, 1986) , Poitevin (1989) and in addition would provide passengers with a free dinner (Lane, 1942, p.47) . In the end, the competing Exchange Line, "whose resources were small compared to those of" the Union Line, collapsed (Lane, 1942, p.47) . During the price war, "the wellfinanced Union Line simply took some planned temporary losses, marking them down for what they were: an investment in future prices" (Renehan, 2007, p. 108 ). There were similar episodes throughout Vanderbilt's career. Weiman and Levin (1994) describe Southern Bell Telephone's aggressive pricing policy toward competitors around 1900: SBT endured persistent "operating losses with no tendency toward accommodation" and "rejected the offer of a competitor in Lynchburg, Virginia, to 'raise rates ... , each company agreeing not to take the subscribers of the other' " (p.114). Lamoreaux (1985) describes repeated failures to collude on high prices in the steel wire nail industry (pp.62-76) and the newsprint industry (pp. [42] [43] [44] [45] .
Exit need not occur through bankruptcy. A failing firm might sell out to a rival at a low price. If there is some friction preventing mergers between financially strong firms, that interpretation of "forced exit" is also consistent with the model here.
Genesove and Mullin (2006) argue that predatory pricing by the American Sugar
Refining Company around 1900 allowed it to buy out competitors at prices that were "simply too low to be consistent with competitive conditions" (p.62). Similarly, Burns (1986) In contrast, there are of course many more industries characterized by a stable market structure with multiple firms. The model here can explain that outcome either through some impatience on the part of the firms or through the possibility of entry, as discussed above. More broadly, the no-collusion result here applies when the prospect of forced exit in the relatively near future is relevant, as might be the case in a new industry where entry requires financing a large capital investment (as in many of the examples above) or in an industry facing declining demand.
Relation to literature. Theorem 1 is in contrast with folk theorems for repeated games such as Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) . Here, a firm cannot be rewarded or punished in the future by a rival firm that is about to exit, and so the logic of the folk theorem does not apply. Folk theorems for stochastic games (Dutta, 1995 
More generally, for each number of active firms n ∈ {2, . . . , N }, let π C (n) denote the maximum total profits that the firms could earn by cooperating:
Firms discount future payoffs at the rate δ < 1 per period; the total payoff to a firm that earns stream of profits {π t } t≥1 is (1 − δ)
Outcomes of previous periods are publicly observed, as is the realized state.
Here are a few examples of the stage game to illustrate the definitions above:
quantity demanded is given by the following function:
where p is the minimum price set by firm i's rivals, n * is the number of rival firms that set that price, and the function Q(·) is market demand. Each firm then produces, at a constant marginal cost normalized to zero, to meet its quantity demanded. Market demand Q(·) is differentiable and strictly decreasing below some strictly positive choke pricep <p such that Q(p) = 0 for all p ≥p. A bankrupt firm must set pricep. Firm
The monopoly profit equals the maximum collusive profit and is given by
with the associated monopoly price p M , which is assumed to be unique.
1 Profits are deterministic given actions. All results generalize if random noise is added to payoffs, given appropriate adjustments of the assumptions on transitions in Section 2.1. 
Thus, the quantity demanded for firm i is
The cost of production is 0, so firm i's profit is p i q(p i , p j ). The monopoly profit is
, achieved when the firm sets price 1 2 and sells to the half of the market closest to its own position. The maximum collusive profit is π C (2) = , achieved when each firm sets price 1 2 and sells to the closer half of the market.
In Example 4, product differentiation means that the two firms jointly can make more profit than either on its own. In fact, the maximum collusive profit is twice the monopoly profit: each firm acts as a monopolist in its half of the market. 
for all s, and the inequality is strict for some s. State transitions are independent across firms.
To derive the main results, I will assume that bankruptcy is a threat but is avoidable if firms collude, and that firms' financial strengths vary significantly over time. The three formal conditions on the transition function Γ are as follows.
First, say that bankruptcy is avoidable if firms sharing the maximum feasible profit will not go bankrupt: there exists > 0 such that for any active state s ∈ S,
In particular, if bankruptcy is avoidable, then a monopolist will not go bankrupt.
Second, say that bankruptcy is achievable if stage-game competition is such that a firm can, without unavoidably going bankrupt itself, impose low enough profits on its rivals that a stream of such profits will eventually lead to bankruptcy. For each 2 Section 6 relaxes the assumptions that transition and payoff functions are symmetric across firms and that payoffs are independent of financial strength.
number of active firms n ≤ N , let π(a, n) be the upper bound on a rival's profit when a firm plays action a:
Then bankruptcy is achievable if there exist > 0 and a positive integer τ such that the following two conditions hold: first, for each number of active firms n ≤ N , there exists a (possibly mixed) action a(n) such that for any state s ∈ S and any sequence
and second,
for any profit π. 
Uniform irreducibility implies that there is a bound on the expected waiting time to transition from any active state to the neighborhood of any other active state, conditional on not going bankrupt, whenever a firm earns profits that make bankruptcy unlikely, and that bound is independent of the exact level of profits.
The assumptions that bankruptcy is avoidable, that bankruptcy is achievable, and that transitions are uniformly irreducible are maintained throughout:
3 One well-known oligopoly where bankruptcy was not achievable is the Joint Executive Committee, the 1880s railroad cartel. Firms faced a " 'no-exit' constraint," as Porter (1983, p.303) puts it:
"bankrupt railroads were relieved by the courts of most of their fixed costs and instructed to cut prices to increase business" (Porter, 1983 It would be natural to assume that financial strength is worsening on average if profits are low and increasing if profits are high, but that assumption is not necessary for the no-collusion result (Theorem 1). In the case of Bertrand competition, adding such a monotonicity condition yields the even stronger result that equilibrium profits and prices must be low in every period with two or more active firms (Theorem 2).
In this setting, a strategy is a mapping from the current state vector and the history of past state vectors and action profiles to an action for an active firm. Recall that a bankrupt firm much play a Ø every period.
Let E δ (s) be the set of payoffs obtained in Nash equilibria, given initial state vector s and discount factor δ. them, but nevertheless equilibria exist in those settings, as will be shown.
Price wars.
One strategy available to any active firm i is to start a price war;
that is, to try and drive all its rivals into bankruptcy by playing the action a(n) described in the definition of achievable bankruptcy in the previous section. Denote by σ P W , for "price war," the strategy of playing a(n) whenever there are n − 1 active rivals and earning the monopoly profit if all other firms exit. 4 The expected payoff from σ P W provides a lower bound on a firm's continuation payoff in equilibrium at any state vector. That lower bound will play a key role in the proof of the no-collusion result (Theorem 1), specifically in Lemma 2 below. To analyze that bound, it will be useful to introduce the following notation.
Given any state vector s and strategy profile σ, define for each active firm i ∈ I(s) the possibly infinite random variable
(s, σ) denotes the number of periods until firm i goes bankrupt, starting from state vector s, when firms use strategy σ. For each n ∈ {2, . . . , N }, initial state vector s ∈ S(n), strategy profile σ, and active firm i ∈ I(s), define the probability
is the probability that firm i "wins" -that is, the probability that each other active firm goes bankrupt first. For each firm j that is bankrupt at state vector s,
The relevant lower bound on continuation payoffs in Lemma 2 depends on the probability of winning a price war that a firm can guarantee itself by playing the price-war strategy σ P W :
The assumption that bankruptcy is achievable implies that α i (s) is strictly between 0 and 1 for any active firm i. The following lemma shows, straightforwardly, that α i (s) increases when firm i's financial position improves or when its rivals' financial positions worsen. That result follows because given any current profit level, the distribution of a firm's strength tomorrow is strictly increasing, in the sense of firstorder stochastic dominance, in its strength today. Note that Lemma 1 uses the assumption that state transitions are independent across firms, conditional on profits.
All formal proofs are in the appendix.
Lemma 1. For each n ∈ {2, . . . , N } and each pair of active firms
is strictly increasing in s i and strictly decreasing in s j .
The next lemma, Lemma 2, says that when firms are patient, in equilibrium each firm gets an expected payoff at least equal to the monopoly profit π M times the firm's guaranteed probability of winning a price war α i (s). The idea is that given state vector s, any active firm i can, by starting a price war, attain an expected
where T is the random variable denoting the length of a price war won by firm i. The expected length of the price war is bounded independently of δ, so for δ close to 1 each firm can guarantee itself a payoff arbitrarily
Lemma 2. For any
> 0, there exist δ( ) < 1 such that for any δ > δ( ), each n ∈ {2, . .
. , N }, each initial state vector s ∈ S(n), and each firm i, firm i's expected payoff in any Nash equilibrium is at least
In the next section, Lemmas 1 and 2 are used to provide a condition under which firms cannot collude for long in equilibrium.
Immediate Price War
Suppose first that the set of active states S is finite, so that S = {1, . . . , K}. For each number of active firms n, let s i (n) ∈ S(n) denote the state vector where firm i's financial strength is s i = K, the highest state, and s j = 1, the lowest non-bankruptcy state, for each rival firm j ∈ I(s i (n) \ {i}. By Lemma 1, α i (s i (n)) represents a firm's highest guaranteed probability of winning a price war across all state vectors with n − 1 rivals. If α i (s i (n)) multiplied by the monopoly profit π M exceeds a 1/n share of the maximum collusive profit π C (n), then patient firms will be unable to sustain collusion, given that bankruptcy is achievable and avoidable and that transitions are uniformly irreducible.
The intuition for the no-collusion result is that in the absence of bankruptcies, the randomness of state transitions implies that a patient firm i can get a payoff 
, though, the sum of those payoffs exceeds the maximum total payoff available. Thus, bankruptcies must occur in equilibrium.
For a general state space, the same argument applies as long as a firm's winning probability is high enough in a neighborhood of the most favorable state vector
where s i = K and s j = inf {s ∈ S} for each rival firm j. For > 0, define
and let
Then a sufficient condition for collusion to be impossible for patient firms is the following:
Condition.
Note that when the set of states S is finite, α
When Condition NC holds, then combining the payoff restrictions from Lemma 2 with uniformly irreducible state transitions yields the following result, stated formally as Lemma 4 in the appendix: for any Nash equilibrium strategy profile and any state vector with at least two active firms, the expected discounted time that elapses before the first bankruptcy shrinks to zero as the discount factor δ approaches 1. Iterating that result immediately yields the no-collusion result, Theorem 1. As firms become patient, in any Nash equilibrium one firms quickly drives its rivals into bankruptcy. any Nash equilibrium σ * , the following hold:
• the expected discounted time until at most one firm remains active is less than ,
and firm i has probability within of x i (s|σ * ) of being the single survivor.
Thus, in the limit each firm i's realized discounted average profit is π M with probability
x i (s|σ * ) and 0 with probability 1 − x i (s|σ * ).
Theorem 1 provides a straightforward sufficient condition for predation to dominate collusion. When Condition NC holds for each number of active firms n ≤ N , then long-run behavior is predictable: a winner-take-all price war must occur. 5 Note that the theorem describes behavior in any Nash equilibrium, without the stricter requirement of subgame perfection. Section 4 below illustrates Condition NC in the examples from Section 2.
3.1. Necessity of Condition NC. Condition NC, the sufficient condition -given the maintained assumptions of uniform irreducibility and achievability and avoidability of bankruptcy -for long-run collusion to be unsustainable by patient firms is in fact close to necessary. If at any state vector a 1/n share of the collusive profit π C (n)
is greater than the monopoly profit π M times the probability that a firm could win a price war that it starts unilaterally, then equal sharing of π C (n) is sustainable in equilibrium by patient firms. The distance between that condition and Condition NC comes from two sources. The first is the difference between an anticipated and an unanticipated price war. Recall that α i (s) is the probability that firm i wins a price war starting from state vector s when its rivals try their best to stop it. An unexpected deviation to start a price war would give the firm a one-period head start and thus might yield a probability of winning slightly higher than α i (s). Second, a firm's optimal strategy in a price war may be more complicated than σ P W . A strategy that depended on the discount factor and the current state vector rather than just the number of active rivals might generate a higher expected payoff.
The maintained assumptions also are close to necessary. If there were some state vector s that was absorbing when at most one firm deviates from equal sharing of the collusive profit π C (n), then patient firms could collude, so something like irreducibility is necessary for Theorem 1. Similarly, if bankruptcy were not achievable, then standard repeated games constructions of collusive equilibria would apply. Lastly, if bankruptcy were not avoidable, then under any profile of strategies in the long run all firms would go bankrupt. 5 In this case, the set of feasible and individually rational dynamic payoffs has full dimension, but as δ → 1 the limiting set of equilibrium payoffs is a singleton. See Sorin (1986) for another example of a stochastic game with that property.
Examples
Recall that in the Bertrand and linear Cournot settings, Examples 1 and 2, the maximum collusive profit π C (n) is the same as the monopoly profit π M for any number of active firms n. In that case, Condition NC simplifies to α * (n) > 1/n: if a firm in a very favorable position has a better than even chance of winning a price war, then a price war is inevitable.
On the other hand, in Cournot competition with quadratic costs and in Hotelling competition, Examples 3 and 4, π C (n) is strictly higher than π M , and so a maximum winning probability α * (n) higher than 1/n is needed to rule out collusion. In fact, in the Hotelling example with two firms, the collusive profit π C (2) is twice the monopoly profit π M , so Condition NC does not hold for any probability α * (2). In particular, the strategy where both firms price at the profit-maximizing level p = If the probability of bankruptcy is strictly decreasing in profit, then Firm 1 is at a disadvantage.
Specifically, transitions are such that when Firm 1 starts a price war, then 1) after each period each firm either moves down one state or stays at the current state, 2) the probability γ D > 0 that Firm 2, earning profit 0, moves down is constant across active states, and 3) the probability that Firm 1, earning −c(a/b) 2 , moves down is
Besides the parameters γ D and θ, it will be useful to keep track of the ratio of
strictly between 1 and 2: colluding firms get more than π M but not twice as much.
Recall that K ≥ 2 is the number of non-bankruptcy levels of financial strength.
In this setting, Condition NC can be rewritten as The assumptions on the transition functions make it straightforward to calculate the maximum guaranteed probability of winning a price war, α * (2) = α i (K, 1), and answer those questions. The details of the computation are in the online appendix.
The results are presented in Claim 1.
Claim 1. In the example above, Condition NC holds if the number of financial strength levels K exceeds K(R, θ), where
Condition NC holds for any K ≥ 2 if the transition disadvantage θ is less than
The required number of states K(R, θ) is increasing in both its arguments. When the ratio R = π C (2)/π M is high, a firm needs a large strength advantage to make the expected payoff from starting a price war more attractive than half the collusive profit. When θ is higher, then the firm starting a price war moves toward bankruptcy more quickly, so it needs a greater initial advantage to yield the same probability of winning. For the same reasons, the upper boundθ(R) is decreasing. Numerically, as R increases from its lower bound R = 1, the thresholdθ(R) decreases linearly from 2 until it hits its lower bound θ = 1 at R = , where collusive profit is 50 percent higher than monopoly profit, the threshold K( 
Lemma 3 has two implications. First, it means that Condition NC always holds in the Bertrand case when the per-period probability of bankruptcy is low. Lemma 1
shows that α i is strictly monotonic in strength levels, so when the sum of the α i 's is close to 1, it follows that a firm in a stronger state than its rivals has a strictly better Strict monotonicity means that a firm would improve its chance of winning a price war by being the first to undercut its rivals. When the sum of the α i 's is close to 1, Theorem 1 implies that for high δ, there is very little scope in equilibrium to punish such a deviation. The vector of financial states pins down payoffs almost completely, and so if undercutting improves a firm's relative position even a little, then it would be a profitable deviation for a patient firm. Under the monotonicity condition, Theorem 2 shows that when the per-period bankruptcy probability is small and firms are patient, then in any period when more than one firm is active, the market price (that is, the lowest price set by an active firm) is low with high probability and expected profits are close to zero. Theorem 2 implies that in subgame perfect equilibrium prices and profits are low at any history, on or off the equilibrium path, with at least two active firms.
The proof is similar to the proof that profits are zero in a one-shot Bertrand equilibrium -if total profit were high, then some firm could increase its profit by under- As before, history is publicly observed.
Theorem 3 shows that when entry is possible, there is an equilibrium in which a cartel of n * > 1 firms colludes on the monopoly price. The firms in the cartel deter entry by threatening to jointly wage a price war against any new entrant. The proof is constructive: firms price collusively when there are no more than n * firms and price at marginal cost otherwise. If a firm deviates, then other firms price at marginal cost as long as the deviating firm is still active. Entry is allowed when there are fewer than n * firms, but any further entry is treated as a deviation and punished. The details of the proof are straightforward but somewhat tedious. Together, Theorems 1 and 3 show that the possibility of entry can make the market less competitive, at least in the short run -instead of an initial price war followed by eventually monopolization, consumers face joint monopolization from the start.
Theorem 3. When entry is possible in the Bertrand
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That finding suggests that, as Hemphill and Wu (2013) argue, the practice of parallel exclusion merits more attention in antitrust analysis.
Theorem 3 deals with the limiting case of perfect patience and shows the existence of a collusive equilibrium where entry is deterred completely. For a high but fixed level of patience, it is possible to construct similar equilibria where collusion is again sustainable, but occasional entry does occur, especially among stronger potential competitors -parallel exclusion discourages entry better than a monopolist could, but still not perfectly. Such equilibria match qualitatively the behavior of the shipping cartels in Scott Morton (1997) toward entrants.
Patterns of Collusion for Fixed δ
Theorem 1 shows that in the limit as firms' discount factor δ approaches 1, collusion cannot be sustained in equilibrium when Condition NC holds. The focus of this section is to consider patterns of predation and collusion that may occur for less than perfect levels of patience.
8 Theorem 3 is the only place where the assumption in the Bertrand example that firms have zero fixed costs matters. If firms faced a positive fixed cost, then there would be an upper bound, possibly below n, on the number of active firms in the long run: firms not making enough profit to cover their fixed costs would go bankrupt. 9 Besides the collusive equilibrium described in Theorem 3, when entry is possible there are also other equilibria that may feature lower prices.
The role of patience.
Increasing firms' patience has conflicting effects on the ability to collude. There is the usual repeated-game effect: a patient firm is less willing to sacrifice future collusive profits for a one-time gain from undercutting its rivals, so increasing δ makes collusion easier to sustain. On the other hand, increasing δ also makes a firm value a potential future stream of monopoly profits more highly relative to the short-run losses of a price war, so collusion becomes harder to sustain.
Proposition 1 in the online appendix describes examples where in one case raising δ facilitates collusion, but in another case it destroys the possibility of collusion.
Note that the effect of adding a positive trend to demand for the firms' product (so that the monopoly profit π M increases over time) is qualitatively similar to that of an increase in δ: the opportunity cost of a price war today is lower relative to the value of future monopoly profits, but the one-shot gain from undercutting today is similarly smaller relative to the value of future collusive profits.
Cartel size. Changes in the number of firms have a similarly ambiguous ef-
fect. The more rivals a firm has, the smaller its share of the collusive profit and the greater the one-time benefit from undercutting the monopoly price. However, a firm's chances of winning a price war also decrease with the number of other firms. In the standard model of repeated Bertrand competition, only the first effect is present, and so increasing the size of a cartel always reduces the incentive to collude.
Proposition 2 in the online appendix describes one example where collusion on the monopoly price is sustainable with two or three firms but not with four, and another example where three firms cannot collude but two or four can. Those patterns suggest that when the initial number of firms is high, there may be a price war that lasts not until only one firm is left, but until the number of active firms is consistent with collusion. In that case, long-run cartel size may depend on initial conditions.
Unequal market shares. For a fixed level of patience, collusion with unequal
sharing of profits may be sustainable when symmetric sharing is not. In particular, giving a larger share to firms in strong financial states can help sustain collusion. The difficulty with symmetric sharing is that a strong firm's advantage in the probability of winning a price war is not matched by an advantage in profits. Transferring profit from weak firms to a strong firm can reduce the strong firm's incentive to start a price war in two ways. First, it obviously increases the firm's instantaneous profit. Second, if higher profits today lead to higher expected financial states tomorrow, then the transfers increase the average number of periods that the strong firm will maintain its advantage and corresponding high profits.
10
Proposition 3 in the online appendix describes a two-firm example in which symmetric collusion, where each firm gets half the total collusive profit each, period is not sustainable. There is, though, an SPE such that when the firms' financial strengths are uneven, the stronger firm gets 90 percent of the profit.
11
To share profit unequally, firms could, for example, divide the market into regions of different sizes and assign each region to a specific firm. Griffin (2000, p.11) presents evidence that "members of most cartels recognize that price-fixing schemes are more effective if the cartel also allocates sales volume among the firms," and Harrington costs vary over time, dividing quantity allows firms to allocate production efficiently.
while in the meantime earning collusive profits. In the online appendix, Proposition 4 presents a Bertrand example where there is no equilibrium in which the two firms always collude on the monopoly price p M . There is, however, an SPE in which they price at p M when they have equal strength, and they set price 0 otherwise. 12 
Robustness
The availability of a public randomization device does not affect any of the results.
If firms could commit to future prices, then a price war need not result, because weak firms could credibly promise to give a currently strong firm a high share of profits forever. However, Lemma 2 would still hold -initial financial strengths would still influence long-run payoffs, which are restricted by the threat of a price war.
The appendix proves a stronger version of Theorem 1 that allows both stage-game payoff functions and state transition functions to vary both by firm and by state. For example, a firm with a lower marginal cost than its rivals or a lower probability of transitioning to bankruptcy would have an advantage in a price war for any vector of financial strengths. Each firm's probability of winning a price war would still be increasing in its own strength and decreasing in its rivals strengths, though, and so the argument behind Theorem 1 goes through with no substantial changes. Even a firm with a permanent advantage would want to "lock in" that advantage at its highest point by starting a price war.
Private states. In the model of Section 2, firms' financial strengths are publicly observed, but I speculate that the no-collusion result extends to the case of asymmetric information. Suppose that each firm observes its own state but not the states of other firms. Instead, a firm knows only which of its rivals are still active. In every period (except possibly the first, if firms start at the strongest state), the uniform irreducibility condition implies that each firm assigns probability bounded away from zero to its' rivals being in states below the strongest state K. When a firm is in or very close to state K, then, it expects to have an advantage over its rivals in a price war. Thus, the argument behind Theorem 1 likely still holds. 12 Fershtman and Pakes (2000) present a somewhat similar example, in which collusion cannot be sustained between one firm in a high-quality state and two other firms in very low-quality states.
More precisely, uniform irreducibility implies the following: there exists > 0 such that for any vector of states s, after each period, regardless of the action profile a played, either 1) the probability that one or more firms go bankrupt is at least or 2) for each active firm i, the probability that firm i moves to a new state s i / ∈
[s i − , s i + ] is at least . If neither condition held, then the outcome from repeatedly playing a starting from state vector s would contradict the definition of uniform irreducibility. Then the probability that a firm in state K moves to a state below K − is at least whenever an action unlikely to lead to bankruptcy is played. Since tomorrow's state is stochastically increasing in today's state, the probability that a firm is in a state below K − after such an action is at least regardless of its previous state. Thus, no matter what information firm i has about firm j's state in period t -even if firm j's action choice in period t perfectly reveals its period-t state -firm i must assign probability no higher than 1 − to firm j's state in period t + 1 being above K − , as long as the action profile in period t was unlikely to cause bankruptcy.
For any sequence of actions, with high probability either a bankruptcy occurs or each firm approaches the strongest state K, and so the logic of Theorem 1 still applies. Condition NC extends to a sufficient condition for the no-collusion result with private states: just replace α * (n) with a firm's probability of winning if it starts a price war when it is close to state K and each of its n − 1 rivals is below state K − with probability at least . Note that in the Bertrand case the set of equilibria is nonempty, because the price-war strategy profile is still a Nash equilibrium with private states. In fact, it is a sequential equilibrium when combined with appropriate beliefs. Existence of equilibrium in the general case is not guaranteed, though.
Unbounded state space. In the model so far, there is an upper bound K on the space of financial strengths. However, the argument behind the no-collusion result does not rely on the state space being bounded. Rather, the proof requires the existence of a state vector at which a firm 1) has a high probability of winning a price war, so that Condition NC holds, and 2) expects that its probability of winning will very likely decrease in the future. Those conditions are satisfied if conditional on the action profile a firm's state follows a stationary autoregressive process, for example.
The key is that the process be mean-reverting, although the mean and the rate of reversion may depend on actions. I speculate that that property plus irreducibility is enough for the no-collusion result.
The same holds true if states are private information. When a firm reaches a state high enough above the action-conditional mean, then the independence across firms and the mean-reverting nature of the state transitions make it very likely that its rivals are weaker. Thus, the firm expects to have an advantage in a price war. Mean reversion will erode that advantage, so the firm prefers an immediate price war.
Other dynamic games
The logic behind the no-collusion result extends to a broad class of dynamic games. 
where s t and a t are the realized state and the chosen action profile, respectively, in period t. 13 For any strategy profile σ and initial state s, let U δ (σ, s) be the expectation over actions, states, and the stopping time of the payoff vector in Expression 2.
For each state s, let Σ ∞ (s) denote the set of strategy profiles under which no player ever stops the game, given initial state s. Definē
as the upper bound on the sum of payoffs for patient firms achievable by such strategies. (In the model of Section 2, that upper bound is the maximum collusive payoff.) 13 Such games are related to stopping games, although the literature on stopping games typically assumes that payoffs are undiscounted, that a player's only action choices within a period are to stop or continue, and that there is a fixed vector of payoffs that players receive if no one ever stops.
Denote by B(s, ) the closed ball of radius centered at state s. Let S(i, ) ≡ {s ∈ S : i ∈ I(s ) ∀s ∈ B(s, )}, and let I * ⊆ I denote the set of players for whom S(i, ) is nonempty for some > 0: players in I * can stop the game in some neighborhood of states. Next, for each player i ∈ I * , > 0, and state s ∈ S(i, ), let .) The no-collusion result extends as follows:
Theorem 4. In the class of dynamic games described above, if i) for any > 0, there exists a finite T ( ) such that the expected transition time from s to B(s , )
is less than T ( ) for any two states s and s and any strategy σ ∈ Σ ∞ (s), and ii) i∈I * w i > sup s∈Sū (s), then as δ → 1, in any equilibrium the expected discounted time until some player ends the game shrinks to zero.
The proof of Theorem 4 is essentially identical to that of Theorem 1 and is omitted.
The intuition is as before: if the sum of payoffs that players have a chance to guarantee themselves by ending the game exceeds the total available payoffs, then players cannot commit to continue the game even if doing so is efficient. Examples might include deciding when to call a vote or election, or an employer trying to break up a strike by making expiring offers of higher wages to individual workers in sequence.
The model in Section 2 differs from the class of stochastic games considered here in two ways. First, when firms compete the "stop" decision is not a one-time choice: firms can conduct a price war for a while and then return to colluding. Second, the value of stopping depends on the discount factor, which determines the relative weight on the low profits during a price war in total discounted payoffs. Neither difference is important as firms become patient.
Summary and Discussion
This paper models oligopolistic competition between patient firms. After a string of low profits, firms can be driven into bankruptcy and permanent exit. The expected time until bankruptcy during a price war depends on the firm's financial strength, which varies stochastically over time. That feature changes the range of equilibrium outcomes for patient firms dramatically: under Condition NC collusion is unsustainable, and every Nash equilibrium involves an immediate price war that lasts until at most one firm is left. That result is robust to several natural extensions of the model, 
The assumption that bankruptcy is achievable ensures that these expectations exist and that the supremum is finite. Then regardless of the strategy of rival firms, the expected payoff to firm i from starting a price war in state s is at least
) For high enough δ, then, firm i can guarantee itself a payoff arbitrarily close to α i (s) π M , and so its equilibrium payoff must be at least that high. 
The generalization of Condition NC to the general setting is the following:
Theorem 5 extends the no-collusion result, Theorem 1, to the general case. • the expected discounted time until at most one firm remains active is less than ,
• there exist probabilities {x i (s|σ 
and choose an integer m * > ln( Plugging Expression 4 into Expression 3 yields
and rearranging gives
That is, the probability that the first bankruptcy occurs after the 0 -neighborhood of each active firm i's most favorable state vector s i (I) is reached is at most P (I) when δ is high enough. Once each neighborhood has been reached, repeat the argument.
Thus, the probability that no firm goes bankrupt before m * such collections of arrivals of most favorable neighborhoods is at most (P (I))
. Then, since we are
To complete the proof, setT ( ) =T (η), and choose a threshold δ( ) ∈ (δ * ( * ), 1)
Then for all δ ≥ δ( ) and any Nash
Appendix C. Proofs from Section 4.2
Proof of Lemma 3. In the Bertrand example, the price-war strategy σ P W gives each firm a profit of zero, so
where
is the number of periods until firm i goes bankrupt, starting from state s, when it earns zero profit in every period. Let T (1) and T (2) be the highest and second-highest realized values of T
P W i
(s i ), i ∈ I(s). Then the probability that no firm wins the price war, 1 − i α i (s), is the probability that T (1) = T (2) . Because state transitions are independent across firms, the probability that the last firm goes bankrupt in the same period as the second-to-last firm (that outcome includes the case that the last n > 2 firms all go bankrupt at the same time) is no greater thanγ, the bound on the per-period probability of going bankrupt. Thus, 1 − i α i (s) ≤γ.
Proof of Theorem 2. First, note that for any η > 0, strategy profile σ * can be a Nash 
Because state transitions are strictly monotonic (by assumption), and α i (s) is strictly increasing in s i and strictly decreasing in s −i (by Lemma 2),
Thus, for small enough andγ, and large enough δ, an η-deviation by firm i would give firm i a total expected payoff strictly greater than v i (σ * , s). In Nash equilibrium, then, no firm has an η-deviation on the path of play.
The next step is to show that if total expected profit (in the current period) is at least , then some firm has an η-deviation. Suppose that total expected profit is at least , and choose η > 0 such that > 2N 2 η/(N − 1).
For each active firm i, let 
Strategyσ i yields expected profit at least /N − η; otherwise, the mimicking strategyσ i (σ * j ,p) would be an η-deviation from p i =p. On the other hand, setting a price just belowp is an η-deviation from p i =p unless q be the case that
. This is a contradiction, so total expected profit in equilibrium must be less than .
Finally, note that if the probability that the market price exceeds is at least , then by setting price a firm would make expected profit at least π( ) > 0. Given any η > 0, that strategy would be an η-deviation unless the equilibrium expected profit is at least π( ) + η. As was just shown, though, the discount factor δ can be chosen high enough that equilibrium profit is below that level. Thus, it must be that for high enough δ, the probability that the market price exceeds is less than . In a slight abuse of terminology, define a "unilateral deviation by firm i" in a period as the case where either a single firm i deviates from the specified actions or a potential entrant deviates from the specified entry decision and then a single firm i deviates from the specified price. (Using this definition will mean that only the last deviation in a period will be punished.) The initial state also is determined by the number of active firms at the start of the game:
Note that if firms follow σ * , then the outcome will be as specified in the theorem. It remains to show that the strategy is a best response.
First, consider the incentive of an active firm to deviate from the specified price.
In any state, the expected discounted average payoff v dev to a firm i from deviating converges to zero as δ approaches 1: after the period of the deviation, the expected time τ until firm i goes bankrupt is finite. (Even if firm i outlasts its current competitors, entrants will continue the price war and eventually drive firm i into bankruptcy.)
Thus, is the lower bound on firm i's probability of outlasting the punished firm j (at which point the price war ends). Again, that value is positive for large δ.
In state ω >n * , ω =n * or ω j,≥n * , j = i, σ * specifies staying out and getting payoff 0.
Entering can yield a positive profit only if the firm outlasts all currently active rivals in the subsequent price war, which occurs with probability no higher than α n * , where
Even if the firm succeeds in becoming the only active firm, eventually entrants will drive it into bankruptcy; as above, let Eτ denote the (finite) expected number of periods until that bankruptcy. Then the expected payoff from entering is no more than α n * Eτ (1 − δ)π M − (1 − δ)c e ; since lim n * →∞ α n * = 0, that expected payoff is negative for large enough n * .
Thus, if n * is large enough, and δ is large enough relative to n * , then σ * is an SPE.
Online Appendix
Appendix D. Proof from Section 4.1
Proof of Claim 1. Let α(k) denote the value of α 1 (k, 1), the guaranteed probability of winning a price war for Firm 1 when it is in state k and Firm 2 is in state 1. Observe that α(K) = α * (2), so Condition 1 is equivalent to α(K) > R/2.
The function α(k) satisfies the following system of equations: 
The left-hand side is maximized at γ D = (θ − K + 1)/θ, so plugging in that value
gives the sufficient condition
At K = 2, that condition becomes
Rearranging yields the second part of the claim. 
Appendix E. Proofs from Section 5
All the examples in this section are from the Bertrand case, and in all the following propositions, "sustainable" means that there is an SPE that generates the specified outcome, and "unsustainable" means that there is no Nash equilibrium that yields that outcome. That is, the probability that a strong firm becomes weak is 0.1 for any level of profits. The probability that a weak firm becomes strong is less than 0.9 for any profit and 0 given no profit. Only a weak firm earning zero profit can go bankrupt, and the probability that such a firm goes bankrupt is 0.09. 
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2.
Note that a price war (where all firms price at 0 until only one is left) is always an SPE, and it gives all players their minmax payoffs.
Thus, a given on-path strategy profile is sustainable (in either Nash or subgame perfect equilibrium) if and only if no firm can gain by a one-shot deviation followed by a price war.
First consider Example 5, and suppose that there are two active firms (n = 2). Let v ss 2 (δ) denote the expected continuation payoff after a deviation (that is, the payoff from a price war) to a firm in state s whose rival is in state s . In particular, In the equilibrium of Proposition 4, on average a price war lasts for 9.3 periods.
It ends either when the weaker firm goes bankrupt (probability 0.56) or when the stronger firm's state declines and the now-evenly matched firms start to collude again (probability 0.44). On average, then, there are 1.8 distinct price wars before one firm goes bankrupt. When both firms are initially strong, the interval of collusion lasts on average for 11.5 periods; when both are weak, collusion lasts for 50.3 periods on average. Thus, from an initial state vector where both firms are weak, the expected time until one firm goes bankrupt is 106 periods. By comparison, if both firms priced at 0 until one went bankrupt, the expected time till bankruptcy would be only 8.6
periods. Significant collusion can occur, although that collusion is only temporary.
